Factor Taxation, Income Distribution and Capital Market Integration
研究了政策制定者在工人和资本家政治支持最大化下，如何确定资本税和工资税的最优组合，发现资本市场一体化通过改变要素收入分配影响政治均衡，导致资本输入国降低资本税率，而资本输出国在政治阻力足够大时提高税率。
This paper addresses the optimal mix of capital and wage taxation when policymakers maximize the political support of workers and capitalists, subject to a fixed revenue requirement. Capital market integration increases the efficiency costs of a tax on capital but simultaneously changes the political equilibrium through its effect on the distribution of factor incomes. These distributional effects are directly opposed in the capital importing and the capital exporting region. While the capital tax rate will always be lowered in the capital importing region, the tax rate in the exporting country will rise when political resistance to market‐induced changes in the distribution of income is sufficiently high.