Inventory Dynamics and Supply Chain Coordination
将供应链激励合同从静态报童模型扩展到动态环境，研究产品易逝性如何影响零售商的价格和库存竞争扭曲，并提出垂直价格下限或库存回购等协调机制。
This paper extends the theory of supply chain incentive contracts from the static newsvendor framework of the existing literature to the simplest dynamic setting. A manufacturer distributes a product through retailers who compete on both price and fill rates. We show that inventory durability is the key factor in determining the underlying nature of incentive distortions and their contractual resolutions. When the product is highly perishable, retailers are biased toward excessive price competition and inadequate inventories. Vertical price floors or inventory buybacks (subsidies for unsold inventory) can coordinate incentives in both pricing and inventory decisions. When the product is less perishable, the distortion is reversed and vertical price ceilings or inventory penalties can coordinate incentives.