Origins of Corporate Governance in the USA, Sweden and France
质疑代理理论的行为假设可能过度反映美国制度背景，无法解释其他国家的治理传统。通过历史社会学分析美国、瑞典和法国的政治、文化和经济制度，探讨其公司治理实践的不同演变路径及原因。
We reason that agency theory’s behavioral assumptions may too closely reflect the US institutional context to explain the governance heritages that exist elsewhere. We propose that what constitutes opportunistic behavior and what can be done to limit it may vary due to differences in national background and formal institutions. We then test the validity of this nationally bounded model using historical sociology analysis of three nations whose corporate governance heritages are believed to differ (USA, Sweden, and France). Specifically, we review their political, cultural, and economic institutions to explore the different ways that their governance practices have evolved and infer causes for these historical variations.