Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades
研究短期交易者获取私人信息的策略互补性，发现信息成本足够低时存在连续均衡，而价格观察不完美则唯一确定强理性预期均衡，并揭示价格、交易量和信息获取的两种不同演化模式。
In a financial market where agents trade for short-term profit and where news can increase the uncertainty of the public belief, there are strategic complementarities in the acquisition of private information and if the cost of information is sufficient small, a continuum of equilibrium strategies. Imperfect observation of past prices reduces the continuum of Nash-equilibrium to a Strongly Rational-Expectations Equilibrium. In that equilibrium, there are two sharply different regimes for the evolution of the price, the volume of trade and the information acquisition.