Internal versus External Financing: An Optimal Contracting Approach*
通过最优金融契约模型，比较集中融资（总部为多个项目统一融资）与分散融资（各项目独立融资）的利弊，发现集中融资虽能利用内部流动性，但会弱化市场约束、加剧融资约束，并预测企业集团的平均生产率低于独立企业。
Abstract We study optimal financial contracting for centralized and decentralized firms. Under centralized contracting, headquarters raises funds on behalf of multiple projects. Under decentralized contracting, each project raises funds separately on the external capital market. The benefit of centralization is that headquarters can use excess liquidity from high cash‐flow projects to buy continuation rights for low cash‐flow projects. The cost is that headquarters may pool cash flows from several projects and self‐finance follow‐up investments without having to return to the capital market. Absent any capital market discipline, it is more difficult to force headquarters to make repayments, which tightens financing constraints ex ante. Cross‐sectionally, our model implies that conglomerates should have a lower average productivity than stand‐alone firms.