LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*
研究上下游生产商之间的游说竞争如何影响贸易政策的内生决定，基于Grossman-Helpman模型并考虑跨部门投入使用，实证结果验证了理论预测，并改变了政府对贸易政策福利关注度的估计。
Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.