Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market
构建了一个异质性企业在递减回报下竞争劳动力的模型，通过长期合同解释企业增长与工资的关系，并捕捉了企业规模、就业流动和薪酬的规律，同时生成劳动力市场变量的缓慢总体动态。
We develop and analyze a labor market model in which heterogeneous firms operate under decreasing returns and compete for labor by posting long-term contracts. Firms achieve faster growth by offering higher lifetime wages, which allows them to fill vacancies with higher probability, consistent with recent empirical findings. The model also captures several other regularities about firm size, job flows, and pay, and generates sluggish aggregate dynamics of labor market variables. In contrast to existing bargaining models with large firms, efficiency obtains and the model allows a tractable characterization over the business cycle.