Noncooperative Bargaining, Hostages, and Optimal Asset Ownership
重新考察了在投资水平无合同约束的联合关系中，资产所有权对投资决策的影响，发现失去资产所有权可能反而增加投资激励，并澄清了关系专用性投资作为一体化原因的作用。
This paper re-examines the effect of asset ownership on investment decisions for a joint relationship in the absence of contracts on investment levels. It obtains some results which contradict findings by Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver D. Hart, and John Moore. In particular, it finds that the loss of ownership of an asset may increase the asset loser's investment incentive. The difference between this paper and those authors' papers stems from the different interpretations of the roles of the threat point and outside options in bargaining. This paper also clarifies the role of relationship-specific investments as a cause of integration. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.