Examining the Conditional Limits of Relational Governance: Specialized Assets, Performance Ambiguity, and Long‐Standing Ties
研究发现，资产专用性和绩效难以测量会削弱关系治理对绩效的正面作用，长期重复合作也会降低其效益，提醒管理者注意关系治理的适用条件。
abstract Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter‐organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self‐interested opportunities and long‐standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships.