Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection
通过模型探讨群体形成与解散过程中，个体在多人囚徒困境博弈中的收益如何影响繁殖，分析自私行为与合作行为在演化中的条件，指出随机分组下自私占优，但群体选择可通过分类匹配、群体寿命和惩罚规范维持合作。
How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed “randomly ” and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multiperson prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which “group selection ”sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity and punishment-based group norms.