THE BROTHER‐IN‐LAW EFFECT*
研究企业因被迫支付高工资而获得施惠能力时，雇佣决策可能偏离效率，甚至出现过度雇佣；同时发现某些情况下裙带关系反而能提升效率。
When a firm is forced to pay abnormally high wages, hiring transfers rents. This effectively endows the employer with the ability to grant favors, and he may wish to do so even at some cost to efficient production. We refer to this as the brother‐in‐law effect . This article analyzes its consequences. When the brother‐in‐law effect is due to unionization, decisions regarding both the number and type of workers employed could be inefficient; overemployment could obtain even relative to the workforce that would be employed without unionization. We also identify cases in which nepotism improves efficiency.