Monopolistic Group Design with Peer Effects
研究私人企业如何通过匿名定价将个体分入不同群体（如学校、社区或团队）来管理同伴效应，发现与最优方案相比，私人供给会导致群体划分过细且过多个体被排除在外，并指出这些扭曲源于匿名定价而非同伴效应的性质。
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, neighbourhoods or teams. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are a consequence of anonymous pricing and do not depend upon the nature of the peer effects. This general approach also allows us to assess the way the ‘returns to scale ’ of peer technology and the cost of group formation affect the optimal group structure. 1