Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights: Causes and Consequences
用博弈模型分析发展中经济体知识产权侵权的经济原因与后果，发现完全遏制侵权并非最优，且侵权影响福利、新技术定价与采用，结果取决于标签制度。
Abstract A game‐theoretic model of heterogeneous producers is developed to examine the economic causes and consequences of intellectual property right (IPR) infringement in the context of a small open developing economy. Analytical results show that complete deterrence of IPR infringement is not always economically optimal. IPR infringement affects economic welfare and has important ramifications for the pricing and adoption of the new technology (biotechnology). The quantitative nature of results depends on the labeling regime. If the TRIPs agreement follows the custom of retaliatory sanctions under GATT, IPR enforcement will remain imperfect and innovators' ability to obtain value for their biotech traits will be limited.