A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: Dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
为(3,3)政治规则（如期刊评审中的接受/拒绝/修改重投）提供了政策基础，证明其等价于加权多议院规则，并揭示了规则维度与政策维度的匹配关系，适用于政治制度和企业中的多准则群体决策。
We offer a policy-basis for interpreting, justifying, and designing (3, 3)-political rules, a large class of collective rules analogous to those governing the selection of papers in peer-reviewed journals, where each referee chooses to accept, reject, or invite a resubmission of a paper, and an editor aggregates his own and referees’ opinions into one of these three recommendations. We prove that any such rule is a weighted multicameral rule: a policy is collectively approved at a given level if and only if it is approved by a minimal number of chambers — the dimension of the rule — where each chamber evaluates a different aspect of the policy using a weighted rule, with each evaluator’s weight or authority possibly varying across chambers depending on his area(s) of expertise. These results imply that a given rule is only suitable for evaluating finite-dimensional policies whose dimension corresponds to that of the rule, and they provide a rationale for using different rules to pass different policies even within the same organization. We further introduce the concept of compatibility with a rule and exploit its topological properties to propose a method to construct integer weights corresponding to evaluators’ possible judgments under a given rule, which are more intuitive and easier to interpret for policymakers. Our findings shed light on multicameralism in political institutions and multi-criteria group decision-making in the firm. We provide applications to peer review politics, rating systems, and real-world organizations.