REPEATED MORAL HAZARD AND CONTRACTS WITH MEMORY: THE CASE OF RISK‐NEUTRALITY*
研究了风险中性的委托人和财富受限的代理人在两期重复道德风险下的最优契约，发现第二期的激励会因第一期结果不同而调整，且若无法阻止重新谈判，委托人可能偏好回报更低的项目。
We consider a repeated moral hazard problem where both the principal and the wealth‐constrained agent are risk‐neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first period, so that the effort level induced in the second period is higher after a first‐period success than after a failure. If renegotiation cannot be prevented, the principal may prefer a project with lower returns; i.e., a project may be “too good” to be financed or, similarly, an agent can be “overqualified.”