Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation
研究了在评估者观察项目质量主观信号时，代理人匿名（盲审）对激励和项目选择的影响，发现盲审在能力分布偏重高能力者时更优。
The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit <it>ex ante</it> to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between <it>informed review</it>, where the agent's ability is directly observable, or <it>blind review</it>, where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review results in an excessively steep equilibrium acceptance policy: the standard applied to low-ability agents is too stringent and the standard applied to high-ability agents is too lenient. Blind review, in which all types face the same standard, often provides better incentives, but it ignores valuable information for selecting projects. The evaluator prefers a policy of blind (respectively informed) review when the ability distribution puts more weight on high (respectively low) types, the agent's pay-off from acceptance is high (respectively low), or the quality signal is precise (respectively imprecise). Applications discussed include the admissibility of character evidence in criminal trials and academic refereeing.