ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*
研究了在位企业与潜在进入者可以合并时，排他性交易如何被用来改善在位企业的谈判地位、更容易获得买方接受，并可能降低社会福利。
Abstract We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.