Sunshine Trading and Financial Market Equilibrium
研究部分流动性交易者提前公布订单规模（阳光交易）对市场均衡的影响，发现这通常降低预公布者的交易成本，但对其他交易者的成本和福利影响不确定。
In this article, we consider the possibility that some liquidity traders preannounce the size of their orders, a practice that has come to be known as "sunshine trading". Two possible effects preannouncement might have on the equilibrium are examined. First, since it identifies certain trades as informationless, preannouncement changes the nature of any informational asymmetries in the market. Second, preannouncement can coordinate the supply and demand of liquidity in the market. We show that preannouncement typically reduces the trading costs of those who preannounce, but its effects on the trading costs and welfare of other traders are ambiguous. We also examine the implications of preannouncement for the distribution of prices and the amount of information that prices reveal.