Family Governance and Firm Performance: Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities
研究大型上市家族控制企业为何绩效差异大，从家族所有权、领导权、家族成员参与和代际传承四个治理维度出发，结合代理与管家理论分析资源分配决策和能力发展对财务绩效的影响。
After decades of being viewed as obsolete and problem ridden, recent research has begun to show that major, publicly traded family-controlled businesses (FCBs) actually out-perform other types of businesses. This article examines the nature of such family businesses in an attempt to explain why some seem to do so well and others so poorly. It begins with four fundamental governance choices that distinguish among different kinds of family businesses: level and mode of family ownership, family leadership, the broader involvement of multiple family members, and the planned or actual participation of later generations. Using precepts from agency and stewardship theory, it relates these dimensions to the nature of the resource-allocation decisions made by the business and capability development, which in turn have implications for financial performance. Propositions are drawn about the drivers that make some family businesses great competitors—while leaving others at a disadvantage.