Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games
实验发现发送者在有夸大激励时过度沟通，眼动追踪显示其注视模式符合层级k模型，结合消息与注视模式预测真实状态的效果是均衡预测的两倍，可帮助接收者提高16-21%收益。
We report experiments on sender-receiver games with an incentive for senders to exaggerate. Subjects “overcommunicate”—messages are more informative of the true state than they should be, in equilibrium. Eyetracking shows that senders look at payoffs in a way that is consistent with a level-k model. A combination of sender messages and lookup patterns predicts the true state about twice as often as predicted by equilibrium. Using these measures to infer the state would enable receiver subjects to hypothetically earn 16–21 percent more than they actually do, an economic value of 60 percent of the maximum increment.