Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency
构建模型分析企业投资决策与证券市场价格效率的关系，发现更有效的价格能促进更优的投资，企业因此有动力自愿披露信息，但可能过度披露，超过社会最优水平。
ABSTRACT This paper develops a model of the relationship between investment decisions by firms and the efficiency of the market prices of their securities. It is shown that more efficient security prices can lead to more efficient investment decisions. This provides firms with the incentive to increase price efficiency by voluntarily disclosing information about the firm. Disclosure decisions are studied. It is shown that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is socially optimal. This is in contrast to the concern implicit in mandatory disclosure rules that firms will expend too few resources on disclosure.