The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement
提出稳定性可能性方法，将气候政策收益与成本的不确定性纳入联盟稳定性分析，改进了稳定性分析的稳健性和解释力。数值应用表明，在不确定性下学习对联盟形成有负面影响。
Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty.