The role of demand information and monitoring in tacit collusion
通过实验室实验，研究了需求信息（关于下一期需求状态）和监控（对对手过去行为的观察）对默契合谋的影响，发现信息比监控更能促进合谋，且合谋在预期高需求时会显著下降。
Abstract Motivated by the Green and Porter (1984) and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) models, we construct lab experiments to test the effects of two factors on collusion: information (regarding next period's demand state) and monitoring (of a rival's past action). Results indicate that information may facilitate collusion more than monitoring, especially as subjects gain experience. A robust finding is that subjects in the Rotemberg and Saloner treatment cooperate as predicted by this theory: collusion falls dramatically in anticipation of unusually large demand and returns to high levels otherwise. These results suggest that tacit and fairly elaborate collusion could arise in stochastic environments .