Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of Financial Claims
提出首个通过金融渠道而非产品市场渠道阻止新企业进入的模型，发现持有在位企业的股权（而非债务）更能有效阻止进入，且信贷市场竞争越弱，这一效应越明显。
Abstract This paper presents the first model where entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product‐market channels. In existing models, a firm's choice of financial instruments deters entry by affecting product market behavior; here entry deterrence occurs by affecting the credit market behavior of investors towards entrant firms. We find that to deter entry, the claims held on incumbent firms should be sufficiently risky, that is, equity . This contrasts with the standard Brander and Lewis (1986) result that debt deters entry. This effect is more marked the less competitive the credit market is—so more credit market competition spurs more product market competition .