Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers
设计考虑个体与联盟激励相容的最优销售机制，发现买方在信息不对称下形成联盟时，垄断者收益与无联盟时相同；尽管存在套利空间，但信息不对称导致的交易成本使买方无法实现套利收益。
The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individual \nself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers could \nform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate the \ngoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takes \ninto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibility \nfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We show \nthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information, \nthe monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although in \nthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are not \nequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), they \nfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costs \nin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.