Reporting Frequency, Information Precision and Private Information Acquisition
研究了季度报告与半年度报告的选择如何影响投资者信息精度和私人信息获取活动，发现提高报告频率会降低投资者获取私人信息的动机，从而减少信息不对称、提高股票流动性。
Abstract: This study examines whether the choice between quarterly and semiannual reporting affects the precision of investors' information and their private information acquisition activities. In the first part of this study, we show that a firm's reporting frequency has no effect on the average precision of investors' information. However, our analysis of announcement‐period price variance and share turnover shows that an increase in reporting frequency does make interim and annual financial reports a more important component of investors' information set, relative to other sources of information. In particular, the results of this analysis suggest that investors of semiannual reporters hold more precise pre‐announcement information than investors of quarterly reporters. In the second part of our study, we test one explanation for this finding. We argue that an increase in a firm's reporting frequency reduces investors' incentives to acquire private information between consecutive announcement dates and, consequently, should reduce information asymmetry among investors, increase share liquidity, and stimulate trading. Consistent with this reasoning, we find that quarterly reporters have lower average bid‐ask spreads and higher abnormal share turnover than semiannual reporters.