A Theory of Bureaucratization Based on Reciprocity and Collusive Behavior
研究组织如何因成员间的互惠规范与合谋行为而逐渐官僚化，分析私人信息分布、未来偏好及社会规范对官僚化速度与长期均衡的影响。
This paper addresses how an organization becomes a bureaucracy . Bureaucratization emerges from a self‐enforced norm of reciprocity between agents in an organization who exchange favors and promote subgoals which differ from the objective of the firm. Such collusive behavior becomes harder and harder to prevent over time. As a result, incentive schemes lose their flexibility and bureaucratization becomes a necessary equilibrium phenomenon in the long run. The distribution of agents' private information, their preferences for the future and the force of the social norm of reciprocity are analyzed in terms of their effects on the long‐run behavior of the organization and on the speed of the bureaucratization process.