On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements
分析报复在贸易协定中的作用，指出在信息不对称下报复能提升参与国福利，是有效均衡的必要特征，并解释为何现实中反倾销等报复措施被广泛使用。
This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence \nof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such \nagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a \nnecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium. \nWe argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international \ntransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current \nworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies \nare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be \noptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last \ndecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.