Stakeholder Rights and Corporate Governance: A Cross-National Study of Hostile Takeovers
研究了股东、工人和银行三类利益相关者的权利如何影响不同国家敌意收购的采用频率，发现股东权利保护越强则敌意收购越多，工人和银行权利保护越强则越少。
We examine the role of three types of stakeholders in the uneven adoption of an organizational practice in different countries, arguing that organizational practices achieve widespread use only when they are consistent with the interests of the most powerful social actors as enshrined in legal rights. Building on a “stakeholder-power” approach to corporate governance, we examine whether the interests of shareholders, workers, and banks are consistent with the practice of hostile takeovers. Regressions using data on as many as 37 countries between 1988 and 1998 lend support to predictions that hostile takeovers increase in frequency with the extent to which shareholder rights are protected and decrease with the degree to which workers' and banks' rights are protected. We discuss the implications for the analysis of comparative institutions and for organizational theory.