The Distributive Impact of Reforms in Credit Enforcement: Evidence From Indian Debt Recovery Tribunals
研究发现，印度一项增强银行追收不良贷款能力的司法改革，在信贷供给缺乏弹性的情况下，反而减少了小借款人的信贷获取，增加了富裕借款人的信贷获取，产生了不利的分配效应。
It is generally presumed that stronger legal enforcement of lender rights increases credit access for all borrowers because it expands the set of incentive compatible loan contracts. This result relies on an assumption that the supply of credit is infinitely elastic. In contrast, with inelastic supply, stronger enforcement generates general equilibrium effects that may reduce credit access for small borrowers and expand it for wealthy borrowers. In a firm-level panel, we find evidence that an Indian judicial reform that increased banks' ability to recover nonperforming loans had such an adverse distributive impact.