The Theory of Clubs and Competitive Coalitions
综述了俱乐部和联盟经济在参与者众多且有效小组规模较小时具有竞争性的研究，讨论了准线性效用和附带支付下的主要概念与结果，并联系了更广泛的模型。
This review discusses research demonstrating that club economies and coalition economies with many participants and relatively small effective groups (clubs, jurisdictions, or coalitions) are competitive. Small groups are effective if all or almost all gains to collective activities can be realized by cooperation restricted to them. At this point, there are many papers in the literature demonstrating the competitiveness of club and coalition economies in a variety of contexts. To facilitate the exposition, I treat economies with quasi-linear utilities and games with side payments. The main concepts and results for this framework are discussed. Additionally, relationships are established with regard to broader models of club and coalition economies, including very recent contributions to the literature.