Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model
构建了一个面临流动性冲击的银行模型，分析中央银行和存款保险公司作为最后贷款人的最优制度设计，发现小冲击由央行处理、大冲击由存款保险公司处理，且除极小冲击外应收取惩罚性利率。
This paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort. Two government agencies with different objectives may perform this function: a central bank and a deposit insurance corporation. Both agencies supervise the bank, i.e. collect nonverifiable information about its financial condition, and use this information to decide whether to support it. It is shown that the optimal institutional design involves the two agencies: the central bank being responsible for dealing with small liquidity shocks, and the deposit insurance corporation for large shocks. Furthermore, except for very small shocks, they should lend at penalty rates.