The Choice of Regulatory Instrument When There Is Uncertainty About Compliance with Fisheries Regulations
研究在渔业监管中，当存在不遵守法规的不确定性时，税收与配额两种监管工具的效率差异，发现合规不确定性使税收优于可转让配额。
Abstract Noncompliance is an important problem for fisheries regulators, and a number of studies have considered optimal enforcement issues within fisheries regulation. Our article extends this literature by studying the implications of noncompliance for the choice between tax and quota regulation. We first develop a general stock‐recruitment model of a search fishery with illegal landings and show that compliance uncertainty (where the regulator is uncertain about the extent of noncompliance) generates an efficiency advantage for taxes over individual transferable quotas. We also provide evidence that uncertainty about compliance is an important source of uncertainty for regulators.