Credence Good Labeling: The Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Several Policy Approaches
用垂直产品差异化模型分析信任品标签，发现企业偏好私人标签，政府基准偏离时企业会同时雇佣私人认证和支付强制标签，平均消费者偏好高标准强制标签，而贫困消费者偏好低标准强制标签。
Abstract A model of vertical product differentiation is used to analyze the labeling of credence goods, focusing on the manner by which quality is communicated. The results indicate that firms prefer private labeling options. In addition, firms may hire private certifiers as well as paying for mandated government labels when the government's quality benchmark substantially deviates from firms' private quality choices. The average consumer prefers a mandatory, discrete label with a high‐quality standard while poor consumers prefer a mandatory, discrete label with a low standard.