Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
证明银行存款合同能比交易所市场提供更优的资源配置，解释了为何易遭挤兑的银行仍能吸引存款。模型中的银行挤兑会造成实际经济损失，并分析了可防止挤兑的合同及政府提供存款保险的优越性。
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.