Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
研究在线二手车拍卖中，卖家自愿披露信息如何缓解逆向选择问题，利用eBay Motors数据发现披露显著影响价格，且披露成本影响披露程度和价格。
Since Akerlof (1970), economists have understood the adverse selection problem that information asymmetries can create in used goods markets. The remarkable growth in online used goods auctions thus poses a puzzle. Part of the solution is that sellers voluntarily disclose their private information on the auction web page. This defines a precise contract -- to deliver the car shown for the closing price -- which helps protect the buyer from adverse selection. I test this theory using data from eBay Motors, finding that online disclosures are important price determinants, and that disclosure costs impact both the level of disclosure and prices.