Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem
探讨事前交易成本如何导致科斯定理失效，指出科斯谈判中的基本“敲竹杠问题”，并证明科斯定理本身无法解决该问题。
This paper explores the extent to which "ex ante" transaction costs may lead to failures of the Coase Theorem. In particular we identify the basic 'hold-up problem' that arises whenever the parties to a Coasian negotiation have to pay "ex ante costs" for the negotiation to take place. We then show that a 'Coasian solution' to this problem is not available: a Coasian solution typically entails a negotiation about the payment of the costs associated with the future negotiation, which in turn is associated with a fresh set of "ex ante" costs, and hence a new hold-up problem. Copyright 2006 Royal Economic Society.