Economic Determinants of Audit Committee Independence
实证发现审计委员会独立性与董事会规模、独立性正相关，与公司增长机会和连续亏损负相关，但对债权人需求不敏感，为1999年纽交所和纳斯达克上市要求提供了参考。
This paper provides empirical evidence that audit committee independence is associated with economic factors. I find that audit committee independence increases with board size and board independence and decreases with the firm's growth opportunities and for firms that report consecutive losses. In contrast, no relation is found between audit committee independence and creditors' demand for accounting information. Although the analyses are based on data from 1991 to 1993, these results have implications for NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements for audit committees adopted in December 1999. Specifically, the new requirements give firms the option of including non-outside directors on their audit committees if it is in the best interests of the firm to do so.