Producer-Supplier Contracts with Incomplete Information
用博弈论模型研究生产商在采购零件时，因供应商质量信息不完全而设计的合同，重点分析价格回扣和保修两种补偿方案，并揭示最优合同如何根据供应商质量类型和成本结构进行选择。
This paper investigates the contract design problem of a producer when he purchases parts from a supplier, and there is incomplete information regarding the quality of the parts. This is the first game-theoretic model of quality control that captures this informational asymmetry. We focus on two compensation schemes embedded in the contract, namely, price rebate (when inspection is done upon receipt of the parts) and warranty. We show that when a full-price rebate is not possible and the producer and the supplier have to share the damage costs, an optimal contract is such that the supplier compensates the producer by the same amount, regardless of his quality type. However, a supplier with low quality is more likely to be offered a contract with an inspection scheme, while a supplier with high quality is constrained with a warranty scheme. We also show that when the producer need not share the cost in exactly one of the compensation schemes, he may still offer the other compensation scheme to a supplier type depending on the relative costs involved, the maximum compensation cost acceptable by all supplier types, and his ex ante beliefs about the quality level of the supplier.