Mechanism Design with Communication Constraints
研究了在通信成本限制消息集大小、无法完全揭示信息时，委托人如何与多个成本信息私有的代理人签订最优合同，发现分散决策优于集中决策，且最优通信机制最大化代理人之间的直接信息交换。
We consider mechanism design in which message sets are restricted owing to communication costs, preventing full revelation of information. A principal contracts with multiple agents each supplying a one-dimensional good at a privately known cost. We characterize optimal mechanisms subject to incentive and communication constraints, without imposing arbitrary restrictions on the number of communication rounds. We show that mechanisms that centralize production decisions are strictly dominated by those that decentralize decision-making authority to agents, and optimal communication mechanisms maximize information exchanged directly among agents. Conditions are provided for these to involve gradual release of information over multiple rounds either simultaneously or sequentially.