Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information
研究卖方拥有私人信息时，买方可能不完全拒绝卖方提出的未预见事件索赔，导致看似完备的合同被重新谈判并产生事后低效率。
This article considers a buyer-seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer. I argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to 'expect the unexpected', the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency "ex post". Copyright © 2008 The Author(s).