Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders
通过实验室实验，比较了双向拍卖与三种替代机制在信息复杂且交易者少的场景下的表现，发现迭代投票（德尔菲法）优于双向拍卖，并给出了五种行为解释。
Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted these markets for smaller-scale internal applications where information may be complex and the number of traders is small. Using laboratory experiments, we test the performance of the double auction in complex environments with few traders and compare it to three alternative mechanisms. When information is complex we find that an iterated poll (or Delphi method) outperforms the double auction mechanism. We present five behavioral observations that may explain why the poll performs better in these settings.