Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness
证明给予代理人期权并不会使其更愿意承担风险，并找到了激励计划影响风险厌恶程度的简单直观的充要条件，进而分析了看跌和看涨期权等常见结构的激励效应。
ABSTRACT The common folklore that giving options to agents will make them more willing to take risks is false. In fact, no incentive schedule will make all expected utility maximizers more or less risk averse. This paper finds simple, intuitive, necessary and sufficient conditions under which incentive schedules make agents more or less risk averse. The paper uses these to examine the incentive effects of some common structures such as puts and calls, and it briefly explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an agent more or less risk averse, and gambles that increase or decrease risk.