A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing
构建了一个企业与信息劣势的购买者之间谈判出售股权的模型，分析非合作博弈下的序贯均衡，解释谈判失败、市场反应非全负面及折价发行等现实现象。
We examine the sale of equity within the context of a model of negotiation between a firm and a less well informed purchaser. We introduce a simple form of negotiation by allowing the firm to set the price of the issue and by assuming that the purchase is a financier-underwriter who acts strategically. This transaction is analyzed as a noncooperative game, and we identify sequential equilibria that are consistent with observed behavior: namely that negotiations occasionally fail, that market reactions to equity offers are not uniformly negative, and that equity placements are often underpriced.