Winners and Losers from the Privatization and Regulation of Utilities: Lessons from a General Equilibrium Model of Argentina
利用可计算一般均衡模型评估阿根廷1989年启动的公用事业私有化与监管的宏观经济和分配效应，发现私有化主要惠及高收入阶层，而有效监管则主要惠及低收入阶层，且私有化并非1993-1995年失业率飙升的主因。
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is used to estimate the macroeconomic and distributional effects of the privatization and regulation of utilities in Argentina, begun in 1989. Based on data available after the privatization that indicate different kinds of efficiency gains in electricity, gas, water, and telecommunications, both the privatization and effective regulation are estimated to yield significant macroeconomic benefits. Gains from the privatization accrue mainly to high-income classes, while gains from the effective regulation of newly privatized utilities accrue mainly to low-income classes. CGE estimates of overall employment effects suggest that privatization was not a major contributor to the dramatic rise in unemployment in Argentina between 1993 and 1995. This rise was more likely due to the “Tequila Effect” of an interest rate shock.