Expectations Equilibria with Dispersed Information: Existence with Approximate Rationality in a Model with a Continuum of Agents and Finitely Many States of the World
分析了一个大型经济体模型，其中价格将信息从知情者传递给不知情者，并证明在预测函数分散分布时，市场出清价格存在，且存在每个代理人预期近似理性的均衡。
A model of a large economy in which prices transmit information (about the "state of the world" which is an argument in consumers' utility functions) from more informed to less informed agents is analysed. The basic hypothesis is that the forecast functions of imperfectly informed agents are suitably dispersed. For any such distribution of forecasts, market clearing prices exist. Moreover, there is always an equilibrium in which each agent's expectations are approximately rational.