Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover
检验了公司收购在约束业绩不佳的目标公司高管方面的作用，发现收购后目标公司高管更替率显著上升，且这些公司在收购前业绩显著低于行业及其他目标公司。
ABSTRACT This paper examines the hypothesis that an important role of corporate takeovers is to discipline the top managers of poorly performing target firms. We document that the turnover rate for the top manager of target firms in tender offer‐takeovers significantly increases following completion of the takeover and that prior to the takeover these firms were significantly under‐performing other firms in their industry as well as other target firms which had no post‐takeover change in the top executive. We interpret the results to indicate that the takeover market plays an important role in controlling the nonvalue maximizing behavior of top corporate managers.