Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?
通过模型说明，企业可能因调整薪酬合同成本高昂且员工外部机会与公司业绩相关，而采用奖励“运气”的股票期权计划，即使这些计划不影响员工在职行为，对理解非高管员工的薪酬设计有参考价值。
ABSTRACT This paper illustrates why firms might choose to implement stock option plans or other pay instruments that reward “luck.” I consider a model where adjusting compensation contracts is costly and where employees' outside opportunities are correlated with their firms' performance. The model may help to explain the use and recent rise of broad‐based stock option plans, as well as other financial instruments, even when these pay plans have no effect on employees' on‐the‐job behavior. The model suggests that agency theory's often‐overlooked participation constraint may be an important determinant of some common compensation schemes, particularly for employees below the highest executive ranks.