Strategic Jump Bidding in English Auctions
求解了关联价值下序贯出价（英式）拍卖的均衡，其中跳价出价用于威慑对手，作为关联设备选择后续不对称出价函数，为竞拍者带来帕累托改进，并产生介于第一价格和第二价格拍卖之间的预期价格集合。
This paper solves for equilibria of sequential bid (or English) auctions with affiliated values when jump bidding strategies may be employed to intimidate one's opponents. In these equilibria, jump bids serve as correlating devices which select asymmetric bidding functions to be played subsequently. Each possibility of jump bidding provides a Pareto improvement for the bidders from the symmetric equilibrium of a sealed bid, second-price auction. The expanded set of equilibria can approximate either first- or second-price outcomes and produce exactly the set of expected prices between those two bounds. These results contrast with standard conclusions that equate English and second-price auctions.