Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
分析大规模多对一匹配市场中，学生最优稳定机制下参与者操纵偏好的激励，发现当市场变大时，有激励谎报偏好的人数比例趋近于零，且真实报告成为近似均衡。
A number of labor markets and student placement systems can be modeled as many-to-one matching markets. We analyze the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets under the student-optimal stable mechanism when the number of participants is large. Under some regularity conditions, we show that the fraction of participants with incentives to misrepresent their preferences when others are truthful approaches zero as the market becomes large. With an additional condition, truthful reporting by every participant is an approximate equilibrium under the student-optimal stable mechanism in large markets.